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Kelly v. Gwinnell: Imposing Third-Party
Liability on Social Hosts
I. Introduction
In Kelly v. Gwinnell,1 an overwhelming six-to-one majority
of the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that a social host who
directly serves liquor to a guest, knowing that the guest is intoxi-
cated and will thereafter drive, may be held jointly liable to a
third party for injuries caused by the guest's drunken operation
of a motor vehicle.2 To date, only Oregon, California, and New
Jersey have recognized a social host's duty to protect third par-
ties from the negligent and intoxicated actions of a guest.3 Kelly
stands as the only decision that has not been abrogated or re-
stricted by subsequent legislative action.4 In a society that is
growing increasingly concerned with reducing the incidence of
drunken driving, Kelly represents a dramatic step by the judici-
ary to remedy the thousands of deaths that are caused each year
by drunken drivers.' The decision therefore serves as a prece-
1. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
2. Id. at 548, 559, 476 A.2d at 1219, 1230.
3. See Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632,
485 P.2d 18 (1971); Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 534 (1978).
4. In 1979, the Oregon legislature limited a cause of action against a private host for
damages incurred or caused by an intoxicated guest to situations in which the host "has
served or provided alcoholic beverages to a social guest, when such guest was visibly
intoxicated." OR. REV. STAT. § 30.955 (1979). In addition, Coulter was abrogated by the
California legislature that mandated that the consumption, and not the furnishing of
alcoholic beverages, constituted the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon a third
party by the intoxicated person. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714 (1985).
5. See, e.g., Kelly, 96 N.J. at 545 n.3, 476 A.2d at 1222 n.3. The court states:
from 1978 to 1982 there were 5,755 highway fatalities in New Jersey. Alcohol was
involved in 2,746 or 47.5% of these deaths. Of the 629,118 automobile accident
injuries for the same period, 131,160, or 20.5% were alcohol related. The societal
cost for New Jersey alcohol-related highway deaths for this period has been esti-
mated as $1,149,516,000.00, based on statistics and documents obtained from the
New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles. The total societal cost figure for all alco-
hol-related accidents in New Jersey in 1981 alone, including deaths, personal inju-
ries and property damage was $1,594,497,898.00.
Id. (citing N.J. Div. OF MOTOR VEHICLES, SAFETY, SERVICE, INTEGRITY, A REPORT ON THE
1
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dent to other states that are dealing with the devastating conse-
quences of drunken driving.
Part II of this Note examines the absence of a licensee's lia-
bility at common law for injuries resulting from the negligent
service of liquor. The section further examines the role the
courts played in regulating the sale and service of alcoholic bev-
erages during the past three centuries within New Jersey. In ad-
dition, it examines the legal and factual background surrounding
the New Jersey Supreme Court's imposition of civil liability
upon a licensee and the gradual expansion of such liability
through the present Kelly decision. Part III presents the facts
and procedural history of Kelly and summarizes the majority
and minority opinions of the New Jersey Supreme Court. Part
IV analyzes the opinion and the reasoning of the supreme court,
and also examines the precedents upon which the court primar-
ily based its Kelly decision. Part V concludes that although the
supreme court may have properly expanded the liability of social
hosts, the court reached its result using an incomplete common
law analysis. In an attempt to formulate a general rule that
would be applicable to all social hosts, the court failed to ex-
amine the nature of the relationship existing between the social
host, his guest, and the injured third party, which is required for
a proper duty analysis under New Jersey case law. Instead, the
Kelly court concluded that liability for the negligent service of
liquor proceeded from the duty of care that accompanied the
control of the liquor and not from a consideration of whom the
controlling party might be. Thus, the court failed to recognize
that a social host's liability to a third party for injuries resulting
from the intoxicated driving of his guest results only if a special
relationship exists between the host and his guest, which places
upon the host a duty to control the activities of his guest.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES 45 (Apr. 1, 1982
through Mar. 31, 1983)). The New Jersey statistics are consistent with those in other
states. Id. (citing PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL REPORT 1 (1983)).
[Vol. 5:809
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II. Background
A. Absence of Common Law Liability for Sale or Service of
Alcoholic Beverages
At common law, it was not a tort to sell or give intoxicating
liquor to an ordinary able-bodied man.' In addition, there was
no affirmative duty to aid a voluntarily intoxicated individual
because all men were considered responsible for themselves and
their actions.7 A seller of alcoholic beverages was not liable for
failing to assist an intoxicated customer, and a seller was also
not liable to third parties who were injured by the subsequent
negligent acts of a drunken customer.' The legal principle gener-
ally cited for this rule was that the proximate cause of intoxica-
tion was not the furnishing of the liquor but its consumption by
the purchaser or donee."
This failure to recognize the existence of a licensee's duty of
care to either his customers or third parties probably stemmed
from the common law distinction between "misfeasance" and
"nonfeasance.' 0 Misfeasance gave rise to liability and occurred
when active misconduct caused injury to others. Nonfeasance,
from which liability did not follow, consisted of passive inaction
or failure to take steps to protect others from harm." At early
common law, the courts focused on rectifying misfeasance, which
was a more flagrant form of misbehavior. 12 Courts were also
hesitant to create affirmative duties that would force individuals
6. See Annot., 97 A.L.R.3d 528, 533 (1980); 45 Am. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors §
553 (1969).
7. See Bageard v. Consol. Traction Co., 64 N.J.L. 316, 323, 45 A. 620, 622 (1900)
(stating that a person "who voluntarily uses [liquor]... until he has become . . . so far
impaired that he is unable to exert the necessary effort to avoid danger, is guilty of
negligence."). See also W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984);
Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REv.
217, 221 (1908).
8. See 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors §§ 553-554 (1969); Annot., 97 A.L.R.3d
528, 533 (1980).
9. See 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors §§ 553-554 (1969); Annot., 97 A.L.R.3d
528, 533 (1980). See generally Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 194-200, 156 A.2d 1, 4-
5 (1959).
10. See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 7, at § 56; Bohlen, supra note 7, at
221.
11. See supra note 10.
12. See supra note 10.
3
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to assist one another. Thus, liability for nonfeasance was slow to
receive recognition."3
Although the distinction between action and inaction seems
obvious, its application is sometimes difficult. The negligent sale
or service of alcohol would appear to be a matter of action con-
stituting misfeasance, justifying the imposition of tort liability.
However, it is possible that at common law the sale or service of
alcoholic beverages by a licensee was viewed as nonfeasance for
two reasons: the negligent sale or service of alcohol was not con-
sidered the proximate cause of subsequent injuries, and a volun-
tary drunk was deemed responsible for himself and his actions.14
To hold a licensee liable for injuries sustained by an individual
who consumed alcohol or to third parties injured by an intoxi-
cated customer would have been equivalent to demanding that
the licensee affirmatively assist another. This requirement would
have directly contradicted the longstanding common law rule
that an individual had no duty to act for the protection of
others1" absent the existence of a special relationship between
the parties.16
Recognizing the injustice of the common law rules that pro-
vided virtually no remedy against a negligent licensee, courts de-
veloped an exception that recognized that a liquor licensee had a
special relationship to customers creating a duty of care to
13. See supra note 10.
14. See Bageard v. Consol. Traction Co., 64 N.J.L. at 323, 45 A. at 622; see also
Bohlen, supra note 7, at 221; W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 7, § 56.
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). Section 314 states: "The fact
that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's
aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action." In
addition, comment c states: "The rule stated in this Section is applicable irrespective of
the gravity of the danger to which the other is subjected and the insignificance of the
trouble, effort, or expense of giving him aid or protection." Id. § 314, comment c.
16. See id. § 314A comment b. Comment b, which covers special relations giving rise
to a duty to aid or protect, states:
exceptions to the general rule, stated in § 314, that the fact that the actor realizes
or should realize that his action is necessary for the aid or protection of another
does not in itself impose upon him any duty to act. The duties stated in this
Section arise out of special relations between the parties, which create a special
responsibility, and take the case out of the general rule. The relations listed are
not intended to be exclusive, and are not necessarily the only ones in which a duty
of affirmative action for the aid or protection of another may be found.
[Vol. 5:809
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them.' This special relationship arose because there was an im-
plied service contract between the licensee and the customer and
because the licensee received an economic benefit from the sale
of alcohol. 8
At common law, however, a licensee's special obligation to a
patron did not explicitly establish a duty of care to third parties
who had been injured by intoxicated customers. 19 To remedy
this inequity, the legislatures of many states enacted statutes
known as "civil damage acts" or "dram shop acts."20 These stat-
utes created a right of action against liquor licensees in favor of
third parties injured by intoxicated patrons. 21 A recent common
law development imposes a duty on a liquor licensee to take rea-
sonable precautions to prevent an intoxicated customer from in-
juring third parties." This obligation is based on the special re-
lationship between the tavernkeeper and his patron. Neither the
dram shop acts nor this new common law duty of care impose
liability on social hosts who serve alcohol.
B. New Jersey: The Role of the Legislature and the Courts in
Regulating Alcoholic Beverages
1. In general
For more than 250 years, the legislature and the courts of
New Jersey have shared responsibility for regulating the sale of
alcoholic beverages.23 New Jersey's legislature, however, has
never assumed a role in defining civil liability for injuries stem-
ming from the negligent sale of liquor.2 '
17. See Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 276-77, 445 A.2d 1141, 1144 (1982);
see also W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 7, at § 56; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 314A (1965).
18. See supra note 17.
19. See Annot., 97 A.L.R.3d 528, 533 (1980).
20. See 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 561 (1969).
21. See id.
22. See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 7, § 56 n.18 (citing McFarlin v. Hall,
127 Ariz. 220, 619 P.2d 729 (1980); Slawinski v. Mocettini, 217 Cal. App. 2d 192, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 613 (1963).
23. Hudson Bergen & Co. v. Hoboken, 135 N.J.L. 502, 508-09, 52 A.2d 668, 672
(1947).
24. See Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 592, 218 A.2d 630, 636
(1966). Justice Jacobs adverted to this fact by stating:
Many states have dram shop acts in which the legislature has specifically
1985]
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Early control over the distribution of liquor licenses and
over the establishment of liquor prices was vested in the courts
by the New Jersey legislature.2 5 This control by the courts con-
tinued until the late nineteenth century when the legislature
shifted responsibility for granting liquor licenses to towns and
municipalities.26 The transfer of licensing authority was chal-
lenged in a series of unsuccessful court battles beginning in
1883.27 The courts consistently affirmed the legislature's "almost
limitless" power to regulate the sale of liquor.2 8 These cases also
established that this broad regulatory power exists because a li-
quor licensee operates his business as a matter of privilege, not
of right.29
fixed the scope and extent of the tavernkeeper's civil responsibility for injuries
which result from his service of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person. We
have no such act and must therefore deal with the common law principles of negli-
gence and proximate causation.
Id. See also Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 552-53, 476 A.2d 1219, 1226 (1984).
25. Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 N.J. 498, 535, 105 A.2d 545, 566 (1954) (Jacobs, J., dis-
senting); see Gaine v. Burnett, 122 N.J.L. 39, 40, 4 A.2d 37, 38, aff'd, 123 N.J.L. 317, 8
A.2d 504 (1939). In the early eighteenth century, tavernkeepers were required to apply to
justices of the peace annually in open court for licenses. In addition, the justices fixed
the price at which liquor was to be sold. Id.
26. See Hudson Bergen & Co. v. Hoboken, 135 N.J.L. at 507, 52 A.2d at 671 (1947);
see also Gaine v. Burnett, 122 N.J.L. at 40, 4 A.2d at 38; N.J. STAT. ANN. 33:1-21 (West
1938) repealed by 1942 N.J. Laws ch. 159, § 1 (granting the right to fix fees for liquor
licensees to judges of the Court of Common Pleas in sixth-class counties).
27. See State v. Treasurer of Beverly, 45 N.J.L. 288, 291-92 (1883) (upholding au-
thority of town council to grant liquor licensees "in like manner as the same may law-
fully be done by the Courts of Common Pleas" in New Jersey); State v. Gloucester, 50
N.J.L. 585, 595, 15 A. 272, 276 (1888) (stating that the legislature has the right to dele-
gate to municipal corporations the power to regulate and prohibit the sale of liquor).
28. Meehan v. Board of Excise Comm'r, 73 N.J.L. 382, 64 A. 689 (Sup. Ct. 1906),
aff'd, 75 N.J.L. 557, 70 A. 363 (1908). The court stated: "The right to regulate the sale of
intoxicating liquors by the legislature, or by municipal or other authority under legisla-
tive power given, is within the police power of the state, and is practically limitless. .
A license is not a contract. It is a mere privilege." Id. at 386, 64 A. at 690.
See also Franklin Stores Co. v. Burnett, 120 N.J.L. 596, 598, 1 A.2d 25, 26 (1938)
(reaffirming the legislature's "practically limitless" power to regulate the sale of liquor);
Hudson Bergen & Co. v. Hoboken, 135 N.J.L. at 506, 52 A.2d at 670 (1947) (reaffirming
the legislature's "practically limitless" power to regulate the sale of liquor).
29.
There is no inherent power in a citizen to sell intoxicating liquors by retail. It is
not a privilege of a citizen of the state or of a citizen of the United States. As it is
a business attended with danger to the community, it may. . .be entirely prohib-
ited, or be permitted under such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils.
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 91 (1890). See also Hudson Bergen & Co. v. Hobo-
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss4/4
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The New Jersey courts have always deferred to the legisla-
ture's authority to regulate the sale of alcohol. But during the
past twenty-six years, the courts have assumed responsibility for
defining the existence and scope of civil liability attendant to
the sale or service of liquor.3 0 This activity proceeded in the face
of virtual silence from the New Jersey Legislature on the issue of
liability in this area.
2. The court's role in defining civil liability
In Rappaport v. Nichols,31 the New Jersey Supreme Court
rejected the common law rule, which did not recognize a licen-
see's duty to protect third parties from injuries stemming from
the negligent sale or service of alcohol.32 During the course of
one evening, four taverns served alcoholic beverages to Nichols,
an intoxicated minor.3  Later, while driving his mother's car,
Nichols fatally injured the plaintiff, Arthur Rappaport.3' Rap-
paport's estate sued Nichols and the four taverns, claiming the
taverns had negligently sold and served alcohol to Nichols.3 5 The
trial court granted the taverns' motion for summary judgment
because New Jersey law had never recognized that a licensee
had a duty to third parties.3 6 On its own certification, the New
Jersey Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that a li-
censee who sold alcoholic beverages to either a minor or an in-
toxicated customer could be liable to third parties for the inju-
ries resulting from the customer's negligence. 7  Although
Rappaport is recognized as creating a liquor licensee's common
law duty to third parties,38 the court did not analyze the exis-
ken, 135 N.J.L. at 506-07, 52 A.2d at 670-71.
30. See Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959) (first New Jersey case
recognizing the civil liability of a licensee stemming from his negligent service of
alcohol).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 205, 156 A.2d at 10.
33. Id. at 192, 156 A.2d at 3.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 193, 156 A.2d at 3.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 204-05, 156 A.2d at 9-10.
38. See Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. at 587, 218 A.2d at 633 ; see also
Kelly, 96 N.J. at 545-46, 476 A.2d at 1223-24.
1985]
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tence of liability as an issue of duty. 39 Rather, it imposed liabil-
ity on the licensee by defining the standard of conduct he had
violated. 0
Under New Jersey law, duty is a legal obligation to another
person to conform to a particular standard of conduct.4 1 The
question of whether a duty of care exists between specific parties
is ultimately a question of fairness. The court weighs various
factors: the nature of the risk involved, the relationship between
the parties, and the public interest in the proposed solution."
Thus, in New Jersey, the scope of duty is not coextensive with
the creation of a foreseeable and unreasonable risk but involves
a judicial balancing of these factors. 3
Once a duty of care is recognized, a standard of conduct
must be established to give notice of what will constitute action-
able negligence." It is generally determined in one of four
39. The court's failure to differentiate between duty and standard of conduct is
most apparent in Rappaport. Although the later cases state that Rappaport created a
liquor licensee's duty to the general public, at no point did the Rappaport court actually
mention the term "duty" within its opinion. Thus, the Kelly court had to imply the duty
from the Rappaport court's use of standard of conduct. See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 545-46, 476
A.2d at 1223. The court clarified its reasoning:
While observing [in Rappaport] that a standard of conduct was contained in the
statute prohibiting licensees from serving liquor to minors and in the regulation
further prohibiting service to any person actually or apparently intoxicated, our
decision that the licensee owed a duty to members of the general public was based
on principles of common-law negligence.
Id.
40. See Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. at 200-03, 156 A.2d at 8-9.
41. See Wytupeck v. Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 136 A.2d 887 (1957). In holding a city
liable for injuries sustained by a boy while he was playing on city wells and water pumps,
the court stated:
Duty is not an abstract conception; and the standard of conduct is not an abso-
lute. . .. In the field of negligence, duty signifies conformance "to the legal stan-
dard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk"; the essential ques-
tion is whether "the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the
defendant's conduct." Duty is largely grounded in the natural responsibilities of
social living and human relations ...and fulfillment [of such duty] is had by a
correlative standard of conduct.
Id. at 461-62, 136 A.2d at 893 (citation omitted). See also W. PROSSER & P. KEETON,
supra 7, § 30.
42. Goldberg v. Hous. Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (1962). See also
Kelly, 96 N.J. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
43. See Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D.N.J. 1973).
44. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss4/4
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ways. 45 A statute or administrative regulation may contain pro-
visions that deal specifically with the conduct at issue. Courts
may also adopt statutory or administrative standards that gov-
ern related but not identical conduct. Judges relying on the doc-
trine of stare decisis may rely on a standard of conduct that has
been established by precedent. Finally, a court may apply the
reasonable man standard to establish a standard of conduct on a
case-by-case basis if no applicable statute, regulation or prece-
dent exists."6
The Rappaport court expressly imposed liability on licen-
sees because the tavernkeepers had violated a standard of con-
duct embodied in the state statute and regulation forbidding the
sale of alcohol to minors and to intoxicated persons.' Violation
of the applicable statute and regulation was viewed as evidence
of negligence."8 In fact, the court placed great emphasis on the
unlawful character of the licensee's conduct. The court stated
that "[ilf the patron is a minor or is intoxicated when served,
the tavernkeeper's sale to him is unlawful . . . [and such ser-
vice] to him may also constitute common law negligence.' 9 In
addition, the court stressed that the plaintiff's complaint was
"expressly confined to tavern keepers' sales and service which
[were] unlawful and negligent" and did not apply "to service by
persons not engaged in the liquor business." 50 Because liability
was based on a violation of a regulation governing
tavernkeepers, it was natural that Rappaport appeared to limit
liability to licensees.5 1
Rappaport did not expressly establish a licensee's duty to
the general public, but it can be read to imply the existence of
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965). Section 285 provides:
The standard of conduct of a reasonable man may be (a) established by a legisla-
tive enactment or administrative regulation which so provides, or (b) adopted by
the court from a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which does
not so provide, or (c) established by judicial decision, or (d) applied to the facts of
the case by the trial judge or jury, if there is no such enactment, regulation, or
decision.
46. Id.
47. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. at 203, 156 A.2d at 9.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 9 (emphasis added).
50. See id. at 205, 156 A.2d at 10.
51. Id.
1985]
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such an obligation.2 In imposing third-party liability on a licen-
see, Rappaport did consider the relationship between a licensee
and society.53 The court stressed that liquor licensees operate
their business as a privilege and not as a matter of right."4 It
concluded that imposition of third-party liability would substan-
tially increase a licensee's diligence in honoring his obligations to
the public.55 Furthermore, in analyzing the risks created by a
licensee's negligent conduct, the court determined that statutes
and regulations pertaining to the sale of alcohol were intended
to protect members of the general public as well as to benefit
minors and intoxicated persons.56 The court then declared that a
tavernkeeper who sells alcoholic beverages to a person who is
either visibly intoxicated or to a person who he knows or should
know is a minor creates both an unreasonable and a foreseeable
risk of harm to others.57 The risk is foreseeable because "travel-
ing by car to and from . ..taverns [is] ...commonplace and
accidents resulting from drinking are so frequent."5 8
a. Liquor licensee's liability to customers
A licensee's duty to his customers was first recognized by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1966 in Soronen v. Olde
Milford Inn.5 9 In Soronen, a widow brought an action against a
bartender and a tavern for the wrongful death of her husband,
who had sustained a fatal fall inside the tavern while
intoxicated. 0
The Soronen court clearly stated that a licensee has a duty
not to serve liquor to a visibly intoxicated customer. 1 Referring
to the same regulation construed in Rappaport, the court de-
clared that this duty "was firmly embodied in a long-standing
regulation of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control which
52. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
53. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. at 205-06, 156 A.2d at 10.
54. Id. See also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
55. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. at 205-06, 156 A.2d at 10.
56. Id. at 201-02, 156 A.2d at 8.
57. Id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8-9.
58. Id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8.
59. 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
60. Id. at 586-87, 218 A.2d at 632-33.
61. Id. at 586, 218 A.2d 633.
[Vol. 5:809
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explicitly prohibits the service on licensed premises of alcoholic
beverages to anyone who is 'actually or apparently intoxi-
cated.' ",62 The Soronen court appeared to justify imposing a
common law duty upon a licensee because of the existence of an
explicit regulation governing his conduct.
63
Soronen also rejected the defendants' claim that the pa-
tron's intoxication constituted contributory negligence." The
court indicated that a licensee's relationship to both his custom-
ers and society played a significant role in establishing the scope
and extent of a tavernkeeper's civil responsibility for injuries
that result from his service of alcoholic beverages to an intoxi-
cated person:
In molding and applying [the] principles [of negligence and proxi-
mate cause] we recognize here, as in Rappaport, that the balanc-
ing of the conflicting interests and the weighing of the policy con-
siderations are the vital factors. Those who enter the licensed
liquor business do so with full awareness that it is heavily fraught
with dangers and that the members of the general public as well
as the individual patron are entitled to receive and do receive
high measures of protection from its abuses. The regulatory re-
strictions imposed on liquor licensees are therefore severe and
many and they properly include the flat prohibition against ser-
vice to a patron who is already intoxicated."
The Soronen court concluded that the accountability of a liquor
licensee could not be diluted by the fault of the patron because
an intoxicated patron could not care for himself.66 Declaring
that it is "right and proper" to recognize that a tavernkeeper has
responsibility for his intoxicated customer, the court implied the
existence of a special relationship between them. 7
62. Id.
63. See id. The court strengthened this rationale by emphasizing that the licensee's
conduct violated a regulation that "[flor present purposes ... may be taken to have the
full force of law." Id. at 590, 218 A.2d at 635.
64. Id. at 589-92, 218 A.2d at 634-36.
65. Id. at 592, 218 A.2d at 636.
66. Id.
67. See id.
19851
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b. Liability of social hosts
Before Kelly v. GwinneU e' the liability of an unlicensed
party for negligent service of liquor had been considered only
twice by the appellate courts in New Jersey and never by the
New Jersey Supreme Court.6 9 In Anslinger v. Martinsville Inn,7
the appellate division of the superior court rejected the conten-
tion that a corporate host who serves liquor at a quasi-business
gathering should be held to the same standard of care as a liquor
licensee.7 1 The plaintiff's decedent had attended two quasi-busi-
ness gatherings during the course of an evening. At each func-
tion, the decedent, Anslinger, was served alcohol by a corporate
defendant.7 2 Later that evening Anslinger was killed in an auto
accident.7 3 Anslinger's representative argued that the corporate
defendants should be held liable because the risks created by
their negligent service of liquor to Anslinger were similar to
those risks created by a licensee's negligent service of liquor to
an intoxicated customer. In addition, the representative argued
that both a corporate defendant and a liquor licensee had the
ability to spread the cost of increased liability among their con-
sumers. 74 The court denied liability based on its view that the
meetings which the plaintiff had attended were only "quasi-bus-
iness" in nature because they combined good fellowship with the
generation of new business .7 Anslinger implied that a licensee's
duty to his customer arises from a pure business relationship. 71
The court commented that holding a business enterprise liable
for the negligent service of alcohol at the business' social affairs
would raise "extremely difficult questions of deciding what is
business and what is social. ' 77 Finally, the court concluded that
68. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
69. See Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (App. Div. 1976); Anslinger
v. Martinsville Inn, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 525, 298 A.2d 84 (App. Div. 1972), cert. denied,
62 N.J. 334, 301 A.2d 449 (1973).
70. 121 N.J. Super. 525, 298 A.2d 84 (App. Div. 1972), cert. denied, 62 N.J. 334, 301
A.2d 449 (1973).
71. Id. at 533-34, 298 A.2d at 88.
72. Id. at 529-30, 298 A.2d at 86-87.
73. Id. at 531, 298 A.2d at 87.
74. Id. at 534, 298 A.2d at 88.
75. Id. (emphasis in original).
76. See id.
77. Id.
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the "[i]mposition of liability in such a situation would require
not merely a considerable extension of the doctrine originated in
Rappaport, but a departure from the theory which gave rise to
the policy expressed therein." 78
Anslinger raised the additional issue of whether an individ-
ual attending a quasi-business function, who takes action to as-
sist or prevent an intoxicated business acquaintance from driv-
ing, owes an affirmative duty of care to continue such assistance
to the intoxicated individual.79 In Anslinger, the plaintiff noted
that an individual defendant, Grier, had accompanied Anslinger
on his drunken travels to two separate meetings on the night he
was killed. During this time Grier had made several unsuccessful
attempts to prevent Anslinger from driving. These efforts in-
cluded requests not to drive, a suggestion that the decedent rent
a room rather than drive, and acts intended to interfere with the
decedent's intention to drive. 0 The plaintiff argued that Grier's
actions constituted voluntary custody of Anslinger, which gave
rise to a duty to prevent Anslinger from driving while intoxi-
cated.81 The court denied liability declaring that Grier did not
qualify as a volunteer and that he did not at anytime maintain
the requisite custody over Anslinger's person.2 In addition, the
court stated that imposing an affirmative duty based upon ex-
pressions of concern would not serve the public interest because
it would encourage individuals to avoid helping others in future
cases.
8 3
In 1976, a New Jersey appellate court in Linn v. Rand84
held that a social host had a duty to protect a third party from
the negligent driving of a minor guest to whom the host had fur-
78. Id. The court failed to further elucidate its understanding of the Rappaport
"doctrine."
79. Id. at 534-35, 298 A.2d at 89.
80. Id. at 530-31, 298 A.2d at 86-87. In an attempt to put the car's gearshift into a
park position, Grier reached into Anslinger's car window while Anslinger was sitting in a
drunken stupor in the driver's seat. In addition, when Anslinger left the second business
function to drive home, Grier followed in his own car while flashing his lights in an
attempt to get Anslinger to exit off the highway. Anslinger, however, continued down the
highway, rammed into the rear of a truck, and died as a result of the crash.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 535, 298 A.2d at 89.
83. Id. at 535-36, 298 A.2d at 89.
84. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (App. Div. 1976).
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nished alcoholic beverages. 85 Linn was the first instance in which
a New Jersey court imposed an affirmative duty of care on a
nonlicensee for service of alcoholic beverages. 8 In Linn, the vic-
tim of an auto accident sued for injuries caused when he was
struck by a minor driver.87 The plaintiff also named a social host
as a defendant, alleging that liability arose when the host served
alcohol to a minor and allowed her to drive in an intoxicated
condition. 8 Citing to Rappaport, the Linn court declared that
"[n]egligence is tested by whether the reasonably prudent per-
son at the time and place should recognize and foresee an unrea-
sonable risk or likelihood of harm or danger to others." 89 The
court noted that liability to third parties flowed from the rule
that a tortfeasor is liable for injuries that result in the ordinary
course of events from his negligent conduct when such conduct
is a substantial factor in bringing about injuries.90 The Linn
court concluded that a host would be liable for common law neg-
ligence if the plaintiff could prove that: (1) the guest was a mi-
nor, (2) the host knew the guest was a minor intending to drive,
(3) despite such knowledge, the host continued to serve alcoholic
beverages to the minor, and (4) it was reasonably foreseeable
that the minor might injure himself or others." The court con-
cluded that "[i]t makes little sense to say that the licensee in
Rappaport is under a duty to exercise care, but give immunity
to a social host who may be guilty of the same wrongful conduct
merely because he is unlicensed.' 2 Linn did state, however, that
a "plaintiff may have a heavier burden of proof to carry when
his suit is against a social host." 93 Although this seems to be an
important qualification, Linn did not describe the content of
this increased burden.
85. Id. at 220, 356 A.2d at 19.
86. Id. See also Kelly, 96 N.J. at 546-47, 476 A.2d at 1223.
87. Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. at 214, 356 A.2d at 16.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 216-17, 356 A.2d at 18 (citing Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. at 201, 156
A.2d at 8).
90. Id. at 217, 356 A.2d at 18 (quoting Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. at 203, 156
A.2d at 9).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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c. Proximate cause for negligent sale or service of alcohol
In Rappaport, the New Jersey Supreme Court first recog-
nized a licensee's duty to third parties for the negligent sale of
alcohol. 4 In doing so, the court determined that service of liquor
to an intoxicated minor customer constituted both a cause-in-
fact and the proximate cause of injuries sustained by a third
party as a result of the customer's intoxicated driving.9 5 The
common law position had been that the proximate cause of inju-
ries to a third party was the patron's consumption of liquor, not
its service by a licensee.96 Only the customer who had volunta-
rily consumed liquor could be held liable for the injuries caused
by his intoxication.9 7 Rejecting this view, Rappaport established
the foundation for expansion of the dram shop rule by fixing the
legal fault for injuries on the server of the alcohol.
The Rappaport court noted the importance of weighing
both policy considerations and the conflicting interests of the
parties when applying the common law principles of proximate
cause." The court concluded that judicial recognition of a licen-
see's liability placed a justifiable burden on a licensee who oper-
ated his business as a matter of privilege. 9 This privilege carried
an obligation to protect the public safety. 100
Soronen reaffirmed Rappaport's analysis of proximate cause
and extended its application. 10 1 The Soronen court held a licen-
see liable for injuries sustained by a customer because the licen-
see had continued to serve liquor to the customer beyond the
point of visible intoxication. 10 2 The court concluded that a licen-
see's relationship to the general public justified the policy of
94. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (indicating that although the
Rappaport court did not analyze the existence of liability as an issue of duty, it imposed
liability by defining the standard of conduct the licensee violated).
95. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. at 203-05, 156 A.2d at 9-10.
96. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
97. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. at 203-05, 156 A.2d at 9-10.
98. Id. at 205, 156 A.2d at 10.
99. Id. at 205-06, 156 A.2d at 10. See also Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J.
at 592, 218 A.2d at 636 (noting Rappaport's emphasis on the balancing of the conflicting
interests of the parties and on weighing policy considerations when applying common-
law principles of proximate cause).
100. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. at 205-06, 156 A.2d at 10.
101. Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. at 588-89, 218 A.2d at 633.
102. Id. at 586-87, 218 A.2d at 632-33.
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holding the licensee accountable to his patrons. 103
Rappaport's analysis of proximate cause was further ex-
panded by the New Jersey Superior Court in Linn v. Rand.04
There a social host was held liable for the first time to a third
party who had been injured by a minor guest to whom the host
had negligently served alcohol. 0 5 Because the court did not dis-
cuss any considerations that would distinguish the liability of a
social host from that of a licensee, this case suggests that the
status of the server of alcohol has no intrinsic bearing on an
analysis of proximate cause when a third party is injured by one
who has been negligently served too much alcohol.'06
III. Kelly v. Gwinnell
A. Facts and Procedural History
Donald Gwinnell, after driving Joseph Zak home, was in-
vited into the Zaks' home for drinks. 0 7 Gwinnell left the Zaks'
residence an hour or two later and while driving home, struck
the plaintiff's car in a head-on collision.10 8 Kelly, who was seri-
ously injured as a result of the accident, filed suit against defen-
dants Gwinnell and Paragon Corporation, Gwinnell's em-
ployer.109 Gwinnell and Paragon Corporation filed a third-party
complaint against the Zaks. The plaintiff filed an amended com-
plaint, which added the Zaks as direct defendants." 0 The Zaks'
subsequent motion for summary judgment was granted, and an
103. Id. at 592, 218 A.2d at 633.
104. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 216-17, 356 A.2d 15, 17-18 (App. Div. 1976).
105. Id. at 220, 356 A.2d at 19. See also Kelly, 96 N.J. at 546-47, 476 A.2d at 1223.
106. See supra text accompanying note 92 (indicating that the court did not differ-
entiate between the rules or duties of a licensee and a social host).
In addition, the Linn court did not indicate whether the fact that the social host had
served excessive amounts of liquor to a minor guest had any influence upon its decision
to recognize the social host's service as being the proximate cause of a third party's in-
jury. Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. at 217, 356 A.2d at 18.
107. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 541, 476 A.2d 1219, 1220 (1984).
108. Id.
109. Id. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1985, at Al, col. 1. This article reports that as
a result of the accident the bones in Miss Kelly's ankle were fused together, six teeth
were removed, and her chin scarred. The article further states that the suit has been
settled. The settlement calls for a $100,000 payment by Mr. Gwinnell's automobile insur-
ance company and $72,500 by Mr. Zak's homeowner's insurance company.
110. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 541-42, 476 A.2d at 1220.
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appeal to the superior court followed. "1
The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court
unanimously affirmed the trial court's decision "' and held that a
social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to a guest could
not be held liable for injuries sustained by third parties as a re-
sult of the guest's intoxication."' The court placed particular
emphasis on the fact that attempts by other jurisdictions to cre-
ate a common law cause of action against social hosts had faced
subsequent legislative abrogation or restriction. " Conse-
quently, the superior court refused to expand the rulings in
Rappaport or Linn to a situation involving a social host who
serves liquor to an adult guest." 5
B. Opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court
1. The majority
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
appellate division and declared that the social host and his in-
toxicated guest could be held jointly liable to the third party
who had been injured by the guest." 6 Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Wilentz observed that by refusing to impose liabil-
ity on a social host, the appellate division had clearly deferred to
a national consensus that regarded it unwise to impose tort lia-
bility upon a social host."' Challenging this consensus, the Chief
Justice pointed out that the application of a conventional negli-
gence analysis to the facts of Kelly resulted in finding all but
one of the four required elements of a negligence action: the de-
fendant host had created an unreasonable risk of harm to the
plaintiff by continuing to serve his intoxicated guest; the defen-
dant knew that the guest would thereafter drive; and the risk
created was foreseeable and resulted in an equally foreseeable
injury. 18 Thus, the court stated that the only remaining ques-
111. Id. at 542, 476 A.2d at 1220-21.
112. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 190 N.J. Super. 320, 463 A.2d 387 (App. Div. 1984), rev'd, 96
N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
113. Id. at 326, 463 A.2d at 391.
114. Id. at 325, 463 A.2d at 390.
115. Id. at 325-26, 463 A.2d at 390-91.
116. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 548, 559, 476 A.2d at 1219, 1230.
117. Id. at 542-43, 476 A.2d at 1221.
118. Id. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
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tion was whether a social host had a duty to protect the plaintiff
from an unreasonable risk of harm.11 This inquiry "involves a
weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk,
and the public interest in the proposed solution." 120
Evaluating the public interest, the court stated that in a so-
ciety in which thousands of deaths are caused each year by
drunken drivers the imposition of a duty upon a social host is
consistent with society's goal to reduce drunken driving. 121 To
support this contention, the court referred to drunk driving sta-
tistics, 12 2 the strict criminal sanctions that are imposed on
drunken drivers in New Jersey, 123 and the fact that New Jersey's
liquor licensees are prohibited from serving intoxicated adults. 124
The court then declared that its own goal was to fairly compen-
sate victims who were injured as a result of drunken driving. 125
The court next examined its prior decisions and stated that
the decisions clearly pointed in the direction of expanding a so-
cial host's liability to third parties. 26 The court placed particu-
lar emphasis on Rappaport v. Nichols2 7 and Soronen v. Olde
Milford Inn, Inc.,28 which had established the duties of a licen-
see to its customers and to third parties injured by intoxicated
customers. 129 Although these cases dealt with licensees, the
Kelly court maintained that they were applicable to the present
case because the underlying considerations regarding the fault of
the parties were applicable to both licensee and social host.130
Therefore, just as a licensee was found to be at fault for serving
an intoxicated customer in Soronen and Rappaport, so could a
social host be found to be at fault for serving an intoxicated
adult guest. 3' The court asserted that Soronen and Rappaport
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Goldberg v. Hous. Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293
(1962)).
121. Id. at 544-45, 476 A.2d 1222.
122. Id. See also supra note 5.
123. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 545, 476 A.2d at 1222.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 551, 476 A.2d at 1226.
126. Id. at 552-53, 476 A.2d at 1226.
127. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
128. 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 47-67.
130. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 546, 476 A.2d at 1223.
131. Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
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rejected the premise that, when people get together for a
friendly drink, the social relationship thus established should
not be intruded upon by a threat of litigation.132 Finally, the
court looked to the superior court's decision in Linn v. Rand,"'3
which had declared that a social host, who had served alcohol to
a minor, could be held liable to third parties who were injured
by the minor's drunken driving. 34 The Kelly court upheld Linn,
noting that the superior court had extended Rappaport by using
common law principles. 135 The majority examined and rejected
various challenges to its holding. The court concluded that a so-
cial host's potential liability to a third party was not dispropor-
tionate to the host's fault because the host's actions are easily
corrected. 136 In addition, the court noted that liability insurance
could be made available to both host and spouse in order to pro-
tect their home or other property. 137 The Kelly court also re-
jected an attempt to distinguish a licensee from a social host on
the ground that a licensee, unlike a social host, derives a profit
from serving liquor.' 8" The court stated categorically that liabil-
ity stems from the duty of care that accompanies the control of
the liquor supply, and thus the motive behind the furnishing of
such alcohol is not a matter for the court's consideration.13 9
Finally, the majority countered the dissent's assertion that
the issue of a social host's liability should be resolved by the
legislature and not the courts. The majority noted that the de-
termination of the scope of duty in negligence cases is tradition-
ally a function of the judiciary. 40 In addition, an examination of
New Jersey precedent shows the continuing judicial involvement
in the area of civil liability stemming from the negligent sale or
132. Id. at 546, 476 A.2d at 1223.
133. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (App. Div. 1976).
134. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
135. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 547, 476 A.2d at 1223.
136. Id. at 549-50, 476 A.2d at 1225.
137. Id. at 550, 476 A.2d at 1225. See also id. at 550 n.10, 476 A.2d at 1225 n.10. The
Kelly court stated: "We need not, and do not, reach the question of which spouse is
liable, or whether both are liable, and under what circumstance." Id. The court did ob-
serve, however, that "it is common for both spouses to be liable in automobile accident
cases." Id. at 550, 476 A.2d at 1225. Thus the dicta suggests that one spouse could be
held liable for the other spouse's negligent service of alcohol to a guest.
138. Id. at 547-48, 476 A.2d at 1224.
139. Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
140. Id. at 552, 476 A.2d at 1226.
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service of liquor."" The court cited, as an example, the fact that
liability had been imposed upon licensees in New Jersey by the
judiciary through the use of common law principles, without the
assistance of a legislative dram shop act." 2 The majority further
observed that there had been no adverse legislative reaction fol-
lowing the 1976 decision of Linn v. Rand.' Furthermore, the
court concluded that if the legislature should disagree with the
court's decision, it has a clear veto remedy."'
In addition, the majority agreed with the dissent's assertion
that legislative hearings would enable the court to learn more
about the consequences of imposing third-party liability upon a
social host. The majority, however, balked at the dissent's at-
tempt to characterize the court's own knowledge as "scant":
to characterize our knowledge as 'scant' or insufficient is to ignore
what is obvious, and that is that drunken drivers are causing sub-
stantial personal and financial destruction in this state and that a
goodly number of them have been drinking in homes as well as
taverns. Does a court really need to know more? Is our rule vul-
nerable because we do not know - nor will the Legislature -
how much injury will be avoided or how many lives saved by this
rule? 145
In concluding, the majority stressed the narrowness of its
decision, which imposes joint liability upon a social host who,
knowing his guest will be operating a motor vehicle, serves him
liquor and continues to do so even after the guest becomes visi-
bly intoxicated."4 Referring to future cases involving more com-
plex social situations, the court stated: "We will face those situa-
tions when and if they come before us.""147 The court emphasized
its belief that the narrowness of its holding would limit fraudu-
lent and frivolous claims." In addition, the court indicated that
141. Id. at 552-53, 476 A.2d at 1226.
142. Id.
143. Id at 553, 476 A.2d at 1226 (citing Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d
15).
144. Id. at 555, 476 A.2d at 1227. The court then went on to list various opinions
that had been overruled by the legislature. See id. at 555, 476 A.2d at 1227-28.
145. Id. at 558, 476 A.2d at 1228.
146. Id. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230.
147. Id. at 556, 476 A.2d at 1228.
148. Id. at 539, 476 A.2d at 1230.
[Vol. 5:809
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss4/4
KELLY v. GWINNELL
the availability of objective evidence to establish a driver's in-
toxication would aid the courts in weeding out baseless claims
and would prevent this new cause of action from being used as a
tool for harassment.14 9
2. The dissent
Justice Garibaldi, as the sole dissenter, stressed that her re-
luctance to join the majority stemmed not from an exaggerated
notion of judicial deference to the legislature, but from the ma-
jority's willingness to plunge into an unknown area without full
consideration of the possible negative consequences of its deci-
sion. 150 In addition, she contended that the majority's intimation
that expansion of a host's liability was necessary to protect inno-
cent third parties from drunken drivers was inaccurate. 151 Before
the majority holding in Kelly, the injured party did have a rem-
edy against the direct tortfeasor, the intoxicated driver.15 2
In support of her decision, Justice Garibaldi looked to a ma-
jority of jurisdictions, 1 5 which maintained the view that the ex-
pansion of a social host's duty to third parties is best considered
by the legislature.154 In addition, the dissent noted that the New
Jersey Legislature had also been active in attempting to ensure
that individuals injured by drunken drivers would be guaranteed
remedies.'55 Justice Garibaldi concluded that the legislature,
having created alternative remedies, was best able to determine
whether the New Jersey statutory insurance scheme provided
adequate protection for the victims of drunken drivers.1 5"
149. Id.
150. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 569, 476 A.2d at 1232 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 564, 476 A.2d at 1232.
152. Id.
153. See Kowal v. Hofher, 181 Conn. 355, 436 A.2d 1 (1980); Miller v. Moran, 96 Il.
App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981); Behnke v. Pierson, 21 Mich. App. 219, 175 N.W.2d
303 (1970); Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1982); Runge v.
Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d 145 (1979); Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev.
99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969); Schirmer v. Yost, 60 A.D.2d 789, 400 N.Y.S.2d 655 (4th Dep't
1977); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc.2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1975), affd, 55 A.D.2d
597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (4th Dep't 1976); Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507 (1983); Halvor-
sen v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 879 (1969). See also supra notes
3-4 and accompanying text.
154. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 561-62, 476 A.2d at 1231 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 564, 476 A.2d at 1232-33.
156. Id. at 564, 476 A.2d at 1233.
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Justice Garibaldi also argued that the role and legal duties
of a liquor licensee should be distinguished from those of a so-
cial host. 15 7 She contended that a licensee has experience in de-
termining levels and degrees of intoxication, whereas a social
host has little experience in this area.15 A licensee often main-
tains stricter control over the service of liquor and often has the
assistance of an enforcer when dealing with belligerent drink-
ers.159 A social host, on the other hand, often drinks with guests,
thus making it more difficult for him to determine the intoxica-
tion levels of his guests. 160 In addition, a social host faces special
social pressures when dealing with a guest who could be a boss, a
friend, a neighbor, or a family member.1 6' Justice Garibaldi con-
tended that a host might find it difficult to stop serving liquor to
a guest, whereas a licensee, operating in a business environment,
can more easily halt service to a customer."6 2
The dissent stressed the differing abilities of a licensee and
social host to spread the cost of liability.'6 3 A commercial estab-
lishment can spread the cost of liability insurance among its cus-
tomers but the social host has to bear the entire burden of such
costs alone.6'" Justice Garibaldi noted that the majority had
merely assumed that a host's liability would be covered by
homeowner's insurance but failed to cite any authority in sup-
port of its contention.1 6 5 Thus, she contended that the majority
failed to weigh the economic cost of liability insurance before
expanding the legal liability of a social host.'
The dissent also criticized the majority's failure to define
the standard of conduct to which a social host must conform to
avoid third-party liability.167 "Is the host obligated to use physi-
157. Id. at 565, 476 A.2d at 1233.
158. Id. at 565-66, 476 A.2d at 1233.
159. Id. at 566-67, 476 A.2d at 1234.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 567, 476 A.2d at 1234.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 568, 476 A.2d at 1234-35.
164. Id.
165. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 568, 476 A.2d at 1234-35 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The de-
fendants' homeowner's insurance did in fact cover their liability to Miss Kelly. See supra
note 109.
166. See id. at 568-69, 476 A.2d at 1234-35.
167. Id. at 567-68, 476 A.2d at 1234.
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cal force to restrain an intoxicated guest from drinking and then
from driving? . ..What is the result when the host tries to re-
strain the guest but fails? ' 168 The dissent then declared that
"[tjhe majority opinion is silent on the extent to which we must
police our guests."1 69
Concluding, Justice Garibaldi noted that the legislature can
consider imaginative alternatives to imposing potential liability
upon every New Jersey adult.17 0 Her suggestions included fund-
ing a remedy for the injured party by contributions made by
drunken drivers, making the social host secondarily liable con-
tingent on a judgment against the drunken driver, instituting a
limitation of liability to a social host, and imposing liability on a
social host only if his conduct has been wanton and reckless.17 1
IV. Analysis
Evolution of the New Jersey law of civil liability for the
negligent sale or service of alcohol provides historical evidence of
the authority of the state's courts to expand liability in this
area. 7 2 Imposition of civil liability has been the sole domain of
the judiciary and remains untouched by the New Jersey Legisla-
ture.173 The common law development of the law of civil liability
for the negligent sale or service of alcohol began in 1959 when
the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a dram shop rule in
Rappaport v. Nichols. 17 Another significant step was taken by
an intermediate appellate court in Linn v. Rand,75 which recog-
nized the potential liability of a social host who serves alcohol to
a minor. 176 Thus, the origin of the law in New Jersey is different
from states in which civil liability has been imposed through leg-
islative dram shop acts. 77 It is likely that almost two centuries
168. Id. at 567, 476 A.2d at 1234.
169. Id. at 568, 476 A.2d at 1234.
170. Id. at 569-70, 476 A.2d at 1235-36.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
174. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
175. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (App. Div. 1976).
176. Id. at 220, 356 A.2d at 19.
177. See supra notes 19-21, 24, 30 and accompanying text. See also 45 AM. JUR. 2D
Intoxicating Liquors § 561 (1969).
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of judicial control of liquor licensing has, in some way, influ-
enced the legislature's deference to judicial authority to define
civil liability.1 78 Also, the development of legal principles
through common law adjudication is one of the cornerstones of
our legal tradition. However, to protect against arbitrariness and
to preserve the distinct roles of the judicial and legislative
branches of government, courts are required to apply established
principles rather than to engage in decisionmaking that is
guided solely by social policy considerations. Kelly v. Gwinnell
reflects a growing public sentiment to prevent drunken driving
more effectively. Unfortunately, the court fails to apply common
law principles rigorously when defining a social host's liability.
This departure from the common law undermines the theoreti-
cal basis for imposing civil liability on social hosts and adds to
the confusion that has characterized New Jersey law in this area.
A. Imposition of Liability Requires the Existence of a Duty of
Care
Judicial recognition of civil liability for negligence requires
proof that the fundamental elements of a negligence cause of ac-
tion exist. An easily stated but often complex threshold question
is whether the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has established three factors
that must be examined by the court before an affirmative duty
may be imposed. The court must consider the relationship that
may exist between the parties, the nature of the risks presented
in the case, and the public's interest in the proposed solution.179
Announcing that a social host has a duty of care to a third
party who is injured by an intoxicated guest, Kelly failed to ex-
amine the relationships among these parties adequately. 180 In-
stead, the court relied primarily on a social policy against
178. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
179. Goldberg v. Hous. Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (1962) (holding
that a municipal housing authority had no duty to provide police protection for 6000
residents of a housing project). See also Kelly, 96 N.J. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222 (quoting
the three-part duty test in Goldberg v. Hous. Auth., 38 N.J. at 583, 186 A.2d at 293).
180. See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 547-48, 476 A.2d at 1224. The court emphasized that
liability proceeds from the duty of care that accompanies the control of the liquor supply
but did not consider the relationship between the parties. See id.
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drunken driving to establish this duty.' 81 Failure to examine the
relationship of the parties was exacerbated by the court's reli-
ance on Rappaport v. Nichols 82 and Soronen v. Olde Milford
Inn Inc.,8 3 which involved licensees, and on Linn v. Rand,184
which itself imposed liability on a social host without evaluating
the relationship of the parties. 185 The majority in Kelly justifia-
bly says that there has been a trend in New Jersey law toward
expanding the liability of those who serve alcohol. 8 ' However,
the analysis adopted in earlier cases does not, as Kelly suggests,
inevitably lead to imposing liability on social hosts. 8 '
Before Kelly, the New Jersey Supreme Court had imposed
liability only on providers of alcoholic beverages who were li-
censed by the state. 88 Thus, in Rappaport, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court had recognized a licensee's liability for injuries re-
ceived by third parties as a result of the intoxicated driving of a
customer, and in Soronen the court had extended liability to the
licensee's intoxicated customer. The use of common law princi-
ples in Rappaport and Soronen to establish a duty of care is
uncomfortably unclear. For example, in Rappaport the court
failed to establish explicitly the existence of a duty of care. 89
Instead, Rappaport dealt primarily with establishing a standard
of conduct that could be used to measure whether a licensee had
been negligent in serving or selling alcoholic beverages. 90 It is
significant, however, that Rappaport adopted the standard of
conduct from language of an administrative regulation.' 9' It can
be inferred that the court was recognizing a duty in favor of
those for whose protection the regulation was enacted. A stan-
dard of conduct can certainly be established by statutory enact-
181. Id.
182. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
183. 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
184. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (App. Div. 1976).
185. See id. at 216-18, 356 A.2d at 17-18.
186. See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 558-59, 476 A.2d at 1229-30.
187. See id. at 555-56, 476 A.2d at 1228.
188. See Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d at 1 (1959); Soronen v. Olde
Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966); see also Kelly, 96 N.J. at 560, 476
A.2d at 1230 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
189. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
190. See Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. at 202-03, 156 A.2d at 8-9.
191. Id. at 201-03, 156 A.2d at 8-9.
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ment, and it has long been recognized that such statutory provi-
sions give rise to a duty to conform conduct to their
prescriptions. 192 Although the existence of duty may flow from a
statute or regulation, it is critical to specify to whom such a duty
is owed. Generally, statutory duties are owed to those for whom
the law or regulation was adopted.193
In contrast to the New Jersey Supreme Court's somewhat
ambiguous analysis in Rappaport, the Soronen court did not
hesitate to state that a licensee had a duty not to serve liquor to
a visibly intoxicated customer. 94 Its analysis clarified the pivotal
function of the administrative regulation in defining a
tavernkeeper's duty to intoxicated customers. Soronen declared
that a licensee's duty of care to visibly intoxicated customers
was embodied in a longstanding regulation of the Division of Al-
coholic Beverage Control.195 The court placed itself squarely
within the accepted tradition of relying on a legislative provision
or its attendant regulations to define the existence of a duty of
care. Soronen does not pose any real difficulty in discerning to
whom the duty is owed because the injured plaintiff was an in-
toxicated customer for whose special benefit the regulation was
enacted.
The majority in Kelly does not provide any persuasive justi-
fication for relying on Rappaport or Soronen to establish the
duty of a social host. Both cases involve only liquor licensees.19 6
Furthermore, the existence of a duty is explicitly predicated on
standards from a statutory regulation that has no applicability
to a private party.197 Careful common law adjudication would
seem to demand that the Kelly court thoroughly evaluate a so-
cial host's relationship to his guests and to members of the gen-
192. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965). See supra note 45 and ac-
companying text.
193. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). See supra note 45 and ac-
companying text.
194. Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. at 586, 218 A.2d at 632-33.
195. Id. See also text accompanying notes 61-63.
196. See Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966); Rap-
paport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); see also supra text accompanying note
188.
197. See Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. at 586, 218 A.2d at 633; Rap-
paport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. at 203, 156 A.2d at 9; see also supra text accompanying notes
47-51, 61-63.
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eral public before expanding liability." 8 In fact, the court avoids
precisely this analysis when postulating the duty of the social
host.
Given the restricted nature of its prior decisions in Rap-
paport and Soronen, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Kelly
was compelled to expand the rule of Linn v. Rand.199 There, a
lower appellate division court held that a social host could be
liable to a third party for negligently serving alcohol to a minor
who subsequently injured the third party.200 Kelly justified its
reliance on Linn, saying that "in expanding liability, Linn fol-
lowed the rationale of Rappaport that the duty involved is a
common law duty, not one arising from the statute and regula-
tion prohibiting sales of liquor to a minor. ' 21
Although the court in Linn claimed to follow Rappaport,°2
it failed to analyze the three elements of duty at least impliedly
evaluated by Rappaport. Instead, Linn emphasized the foresee-
able risk created when one serves excessive amounts of alcohol
to a minor who will soon be driving a car.203 Concluding that the
task of a court is to do justice rather than to adhere to the tech-
nical immunity doctrine, Linn decided that a social host who
serves too much alcohol to a minor creates an unjustifiable risk.
Therefore the courts should not hesitate to impose liability upon
the social host. 204
Although the risks of drunken driving are substantial, risk
alone does not substantiate the existence of a duty of care from
one party to another. Despite the implications in Linn, social
198. The Kelly court itself acknowledges the importance of weighing the relation-
ship which exists between the parties when making a duty analysis. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 544,
476 A.2d at 1222 (quoting Goldberg v. Hous. Auth., 38 N.J. at 583, 186 A.2d at 293). See
also infra text accompanying note 208.
199. See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 547, 476 A.2d at 1223.
200. Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. at 220, 356 A.2d at 19.
201. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 547, 476 A.2d at 1223.
202. See Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. at 216, 356 A.2d at 17-18. The court stated:
There is nothing in Rappaport v. Nichols . . . and its progeny, which specifically
bars the suit here involved as a matter of law. The forward looking and far-reach-
ing philosophy expressed in Rappaport should also be applicable to negligent so-
cial hosts and should not be limited to holders of liquor licenses and their
employees.
Id.
203. See id. at 219, 356 A.2d at 19.
204. Id. at 217-20, 356 A.2d at 18-20.
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hosts had not been shielded from liability by an immunity doc-
trine.20 5 Rather, courts had not recognized the existence of a re-
lationship between host and guest sufficient to give rise to liabil-
ity. Linn simply ignores the task of establishing that the
requisite relationship exists between a social host and an injured
member of the general public. In conclusory fashion Linn makes
a public policy judgment generally reserved for the legislature.
"It makes little sense to say that the licensee in Rappaport is
under a duty to exercise care, but give immunity to a social host
who may be guilty of the same wrongful conduct merely because
he is unlicensed. 20 6
1. Are the roles and duties of a liquor licensee similar to
those of a social host?
Kelly appeared to embrace the Linn court's assumption
that the relationships among a licensee, his customer, and an in-
jured third party are analogous to the relationships among a so-
cial host, his guest, and a foreseeably injured third party. 207 At
the outset, Kelly explicitly stated the importance of evaluating
these relationships. The court maintained that the judicial im-
position of a duty of care mandates an examination of the rela-
tionship of the parties:
In most cases the justice of imposing . . . a duty is so clear that
the cause of action in negligence is assumed to exist simply on the
basis of the actor's creation of an unreasonable risk of foreseeable
harm resulting in injury. In fact, however, more is needed, "more"
being the value judgment, based on an analysis of public policy,
that the actor owed the injured party a duty of reasonable care.
• ..In Goldberg v. Housing Authority of Newark,. . this Court
explained that "whether a duty exists is ultimately a question of
fairness." The inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of
the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the
205. See Comment, Social Host Who Furnishes Alcoholic Beverages to Minor May
be Held Liable for Minor's Negligent Acts, 8 RUT-CAM. L. REv. 719 (1977-1978). The
Linn court incorrectly stated that it was abolishing a common law immunity that
shielded social hosts from liability. This approach is analytically unsound because the
doctrine of immunity prevents the imposition of liability only where there is an estab-
lished cause of action. Id. at 720-21.
206. Id. at 217, 356 A.2d at 18.
207. See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 547, 476 A.2d at 1223.
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proposed solution.208
Having stated the traditional rule, the majority proceeded to ig-
nore it.
The court not only failed to examine the parties' relation-
ships but took the dramatic step of concluding that liability was
based on a duty of care predicated on control of the liquor sup-
ply irrespective of the status of the party possessing such
control.20 9
The argument is made that the rule imposing liability on licen-
sees is justified because licensees, unlike social hosts, derive a
profit from serving liquor. We reject this analysis of the liability's
foundation and emphasize that the liability proceeds from the
duty of care that accompanies control of the liquor supply.
Whatever the motive behind making alcohol available to those
who will subsequently drive, the provider has a duty to the public
not to create foreseeable, unreasonable risks by this activity.
210
This approach is troublesome. Although the legislature may
impose liability solely on the basis of social policy, as Kelly so
aptly observes, courts must base decisions on "more," namely, a
careful application of the common law requirements for estab-
lishing liability. Kelly does not adequately explain how the lia-
bility for negligently providing alcohol can be expanded to in-
clude a social host whose role in society is so different from that
of a licensee. With the exception of Linn v. Rand, 1 which is of
dubious precedential value, the liability for negligently providing
alcohol had been predicated on the special role of a liquor
licensee.
The differences between the roles of a social host and a li-
censee suggest that imposing liability on a social host is not a
natural evolution of the judicial doctrine in this area. The act of
selling alcohol by a licensee is conduct expressly governed by
regulations having the force of law.2 12 A social host, by contrast,
does not sell alcoholic beverages or hold himself out to the pub-
208. Id. at 544, 472 A.2d at 1222 (quoting Goldberg v. Hous. Auth., 38 N.J. at 583,
186 A.2d at 293).
209. Id. at 547-48, 476 A.2d at 1224.
210. Id. (emphasis added).
211. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (App. Div. 1976).
212. Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. at 590, 218 A.2d at 635.
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lic as a professional. The dissent in Kelly carefully distinguished
the role of a social host from the "peculiar position" of a licen-
see.21 3 The social host has far less expertise in gauging levels of
intoxication. 214 The private individual, in many instances, can-
not control the liquor supply as can a bartender in a commercial
business. 215 Significantly, a licensee may spread the cost of lia-
bility among his customers while the social host must bear this
cost alone.21 Furthermore, it is reasonable to impose tort liabil-
ity on licensees based on their violations of explicit statutes and
regulations. 1 '
The scope of a licensee's duties is based to a large extent on
the relationship he maintains with the public. 218 The same duty
may not simply be transferred to a social host. Nor, as the Kelly
court implied, may a court simply impose a licensee's duty of
care upon a social host because the risks created by the conduct
of each are similar.21 9 To do so, violates New Jersey's long-estab-
lished rule of law that the scope of a party's duty is not coexten-
sive with the risk he creates.22 0 Nonetheless, Kelly ignores the
differences between a social host and a licensee and justifies its
holding on public policy considerations: "We impose this duty
on the host to the third party because we believe that the policy
considerations served by its imposition far outweigh those as-
serted in opposition. ' '221
2. Recognizing the duty of a social host based on the con-
cept of special relationship
Although the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Kelly may be criticized, its conclusion can be justified by apply-
ing a slightly different analysis. An examination of the relation-
213. Id. at 565, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 566-67, 476 A.2d at 1234.
216. Id. at 568, 476 A.2d at 1234.
217. Id. at 565, 476 A.2d at 1233.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 18 and 65.
219. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 547-48, 476 A.2d at 1224. See supra text accompanying notes
209-210.
220. Goldberg v. Hous. Auth., 38 N.J. at 583, 186 A.2d at 293; see also Kelly, 96 N.J.
at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
221. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
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ship between a social host and his guest indicates that, under
many circumstances, a social host may indeed have an obligation
to protect foreseeable innocent third parties from the negligent
driving of an intoxicated guest.22 However, this obligation does
not arise because the roles of social host and licensee are analo-
gous. Instead, the court must examine the facts of each case in
order to determine whether or not a special relationship exists
between the host and his guest that would justify imposition of a
legal duty on the social host to act for the benefit of his guest or
a third party.22 s
Early common law did not recognize any liability for acts of
nonfeasance.22 ' Although courts have been reluctant to force in-
dividuals to aid one another, there has been a trend toward es-
tablishing an affirmative duty to act when a special relationship
exists between the parties.225 Imposing a duty based on the qual-
ity of the relationship between the parties is preferred to estab-
lishing a general rule. 26 It avoids both the difficulty of creating a
universal standard of selfless conduct and the problem of defin-
ing a workable rule that adequately covers a wide range of fac-
tual situations.227 A duty to aid one who is in peril was first im-
posed on persons in "public callings" - the carrier and the
innkeeper.2 8 Expanding notions of liability now support impos-
ing an affirmative duty on a social host to his guest when it is
reasonable to know the guest is in peril. A corollary to this rule
is that when this duty arises, it may include the obligation to
protect third parties from the harm a guest may cause.2 9
Application of these principles to the facts in Kelly illus-
trates their utility. The social host, Zak, and his guest, Gwinnell,
222. See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 7, § 56.
223. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A comment b (noting that the spe-
cial relationship catagories currently recognized under this section may be expanded by
the courts on a case-by-case basis).
224. See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 7, § 56; Bohlen, supra note 7, at 222;
see also supra text accompanying notes 10-13.
225. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 7, at § 56.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See supra text accompanying note 18.
229. See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 7, § 56. See also RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) oF TORTS § 315 (1965) (stating that there is no duty to control the conduct of a
third person unless a special relationship is found to exist between the actor and third
party).
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were business associates.230 The evidence suggests that Zak
should have known that he served his guest a large quantity of
alcohol. Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that Zak knew
his guest was intoxicated. In fact, shortly after Gwinnell drove
off, the Zaks called his home to ask if he had arrived safely.231
Gwinnell was given a blood alcohol test after the accident which
showed that Zak had served enough alcohol for Gwinnell to have
a blood alcohol concentration of 0.2886 %.111 Driving with a
blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more violates the New
Jersey drunken driving statute.2 "3 There was expert testimony
that Gwinnell showed unmistakable signs of severe intoxication
while he was at the Zaks' home.234 A court would have been jus-
tified in concluding that a special relationship existed in these
circumstances. The parties were sufficiently well acquainted for
Gwinnell to have socialized with Zak and his wife at their home
for a couple of hours after work.2 5 The host affirmatively pro-
vided a sufficient quantity of alcohol to cause peril. Recognition
of a special relationship is particularly justified because the host
caused an unreasonable risk of harm when he served alcohol in
quantities sufficient to result in a blood alcohol concentration
greatly in excess of the legally permitted level. A common law
duty could be properly imposed on Zak, requiring that he take
reasonable action to prevent his intoxicated guest, Gwinnell,
from injuring either himself or an innocent third party.
Recognizing that a social host's duty arises from a special
relationship with his guest is consistent with the decision of the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Soronen in which the court held a
licensee liable to an intoxicated customer because the customer
could not exercise self-protection. 236 Although the duty of a so-
cial host requires that he take precautions similar to those de-
230. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 4, Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d
1219 (1984) (No. A-3442-81T1) (stating that Gwinnell and Zak had a one and one-half
year business realtionship but had never been out socially).
231. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 541 n.1, 476 A.2d at 1220 n.1.
234. Id. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
235. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Kelly (No. A-3442-81T1); see also
Kelly, 96 N.J. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
236. See Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. at 592, 218 A.2d at 636. See also
supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
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manded of a licensee, the host's duty does not exist by analogy
to the duty of a licensee. Rather, the duty of a social host arises
as a result of his independent relationship to a particular
guest.2 37 Thus, liability can be imposed on a social host without
sacrificing the traditional principles of common law
adjudication.
Although using the special relationship concept permits the
court to impose liability through an impartial application of
common law principles, the rule derived in this manner also has
other practical advantages. It is likely to have more equitable
results than a rule that does not require an analysis of the rela-
tionship of the parties. A number of legitimate problems identi-
fied by the dissent in Kelly result from the majority's failure to
recognize the existence of a special relationship. Although most
social hosts do not have expertise in evaluating another person's
level of intoxication,2 38 by examining the social relationship be-
tween the parties and assessing the host's conduct, one may de-
termine whether it is reasonable to conclude that the host
should have known his guest was intoxicated. Moreover, knowl-
edge of the relationship of host and guest and of the circum-
stances surrounding the service of alcohol will help a court to
determine if it is reasonable, in the case of a large group, to de-
cide if the host actually knew how much liquor his guest was
drinking and if the host had effective control of the liquor
supply.239
Furthermore, the concept of a special relationship will en-
able the court to give content to the duty of a social host. The
Kelly court merely recognized a social host's duty to stop serv-
ing liquor to an intoxicated guest.240 Judicial recognition of a
special relationship will allow the court to consider if a specific
social host should have done more - perhaps take reasonable
action to prevent his guest from driving while intoxicated. This
approach may in fact deter the direct cause of highway deaths,
that is driving while intoxicated.
237. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
238. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 565, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
239. See id. at 566-67, 476 A.2d at 1234.
240. Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224. See infra notes 244-246 and accompanying text.
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B. Determining the Standard of Conduct of a Social Host
In negligence, once a duty of care is recognized, a correlative
standard of conduct must also be established to give notice of
the acts that will give rise to liability. 241 Kelly did not describe
the standard of conduct required of a social host. The majority's
failure to indicate what conduct is required of a social host when
serving alcohol was noted by the dissent:242
Is the host obligated to use physical force to restrain an in-
toxicated guest from drinking and then from driving? Or is the
host limited to delay and subterfuge tactics short of physical
force? What is the result when the host tries to restrain the guest
but fails? Is the host still liable? The majority opinion is silent on
the extent to which we must police our guests.2 3
The majority, although not establishing a clear standard of
conduct, does state that liability arises only when a social host
serves alcohol directly to a guest knowing that the guest is intox-
icated and will be driving a motor vehicle.24 4 Therefore, it ap-
pears that under Kelly, a social host may avoid liability by stop-
ping service to a guest once he realizes that the guest is
intoxicated.245 The social host will have, at least in theory, satis-
fied his duty to any third party subsequently injured by the neg-
ligent driving of the guest.246 In practice, however, it is likely
that a social host will be required to meet a higher standard of
conduct in order to avoid civil liability. Assume a social host ref-
uses to serve his guest more alcohol because he realizes that his
guest is intoxicated and will be driving. If the guest leaves the
host's home, perhaps in search of more liquor, and injures some-
one in an automobile accident, it is likely that the host will be
subjected to civil liability if objective evidence establishes that
the guest had a sufficiently high blood alcohol concentration.
Commenting on this ambiguous standard of conduct, the dissent
241. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
242. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 567-68, 576 A.2d at 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
243. Id.
244. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 548, 559, 476 A.2d at 1224, 1230.
245. Thus, the Kelly dissent notes that "the majority holds that a host will be liable
only if he serves alcohol to a guest knowing both that the guest is intoxicated and that
the guest will drive." Id. at 565, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
246. See id.
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observes that:
The majority holds that a host will be liable only if he serves
alcohol to a guest knowing both that the guest is intoxicated and
that the guest will drive . . . . Although this standard calls for a
subjective determination of the extent of the host's knowledge, a
close reading of the opinion makes clear that the majority is actu-
ally relying on objective evidence. The majority takes the results
of Gwinnell's blood alcohol concentration test and concludes from
the test that "the Zaks must have known that their provision of
liquor was causing Gwinnell to become drunk ... ."247
Having established that the subjective knowledge of the so-
cial host is crucial for liability, the majority creates confusion
when it points to the importance of using objective evidence to
"weed out baseless claims. 2 8 Objective evidence, it states, will
protect against Kelly's becoming a tool for harassment. 249 Thus,
although Kelly speaks only of a social host's duty to control his
own service of alcoholic beverages, a practical result may be that
more is required to avoid liability - even restraint of an intoxi-
cated guest who wishes to drive. Common law principles impose
a duty to control the conduct of another only when a special
relationship exists between the parties.2 50 The court's failure to
examine the relationship between the social host and his guest
leads to an ambiguous standard of conduct and to a rule based
on public policy considerations rather than on an analysis that
considers all of the factors for recognizing a duty of care.
If Kelly had based a host's duty of care on his relationship
with his guest, the court could more easily define the applicable
standard of conduct on a case-by-case basis. The degree to
which a host should take affirmative action to avoid liability
would depend on what conduct is reasonable in view of the
host's social relationship with his guest. More, for example,
would be expected of a host who has served a large quantity of
alcohol to a close relative than would be expected of a host who
gave his employer a few drinks. A rule that requires the fact-
finder to determine reasonable conduct based on all the circum-
247. Id. at 565, 476 A.2d at 1233.
248. Id. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230.
249. Id.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 225-229.
19851
35
PACE LAW REVIEW
stances of the case may be more effective in promoting a policy
against drunk driving, than a rule that merely requires a host to
monitor the provision of alcohol to his guest.251 Such a rule
would not require affirmative conduct from a social host solely
because his guest had an unacceptable blood alcohol level. The
standard of conduct would derive from all of the salient factors
that justifiably flow from the relationship of the parties.
V. Conclusion
The New Jersey Supreme Court held in Kelly v. Gwinnell
that a social host, who directly serves alcoholic beverages to a
guest, knowing that the guest is intoxicated and will thereafter
drive, may be held jointly liable to a third party for injuries
caused by the guest's negligent operation of a motor vehicle.252
This holding is based upon an incomplete common law analysis.
The court failed to examine the nature of the relationship ex-
isting between the defendant social hosts, their guest and the
injured third party. Instead, Kelly court emphasized the risks
created by a social host's service of alcohol to an intoxicated
guest. The court concluded that because the risks created by
service of alcohol to a guest are similar to those risks created by
a liquor licensee serving alcohol to a customer, the liability of a
licensee could be properly expanded to a host.
Risk alone, however, does not substantiate the existence of a
duty of care from one party to another. In expanding a licensee's
liability to a social host, the court failed to acknowledge, as it
had in previous cases, that a licensee's common law duty to the
public stems from his business relationship with the public.
Thus, a licensee's liability for negligent service of alcohol may
not simply be transferred to a social host without first examin-
ing the relationship that exists between the host and his guest.
Kelly does not adequately explain how the liability for negligent
provision of alcohol can be expanded to include a social host
whose role in society is different from a liquor licensee's. This
251. Whether or not a special relationship exists between parties must be deter-
mined by the court on a case-by-case basis and has no fixed definition. It is, therefore,
not unlikely that a court might recognize the existence of a relationship between a host
and his guests.
252. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 548, 559, 476 A.2d at 1224, 1230.
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omission weakens the court's decision.
Although the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court
may be criticized, its conclusion may be justified by a proper
common law analysis. An examination of the relationship be-
tween a social host and his guest indicates that under many cir-
cumstances a social host may indeed have an obligation to pro-
tect third parties from the drunken driving of a guest. However,
a duty to control the actions of an adult guest may not, as the
Kelly court contends, be imposed indiscriminantly upon all so-
cial hosts. Instead, the court must first establish that a special
relationship exists between the social host and his guest. This
relationship will justify imposing a legal duty upon the host, re-
quiring the host to take reasonable action to prevent his intoxi-
cated guest from driving.
Maura E. Mahon
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